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The main thrust of this paper is to examine the  patterns of 
finances in Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in Maharashtra and present 
a comparative picture thereof. We also point out some problems 
especially related to data and suggest ways for remedying the 
situation. This is contextualized within the parameters set by the 
devolution patterns to local bodies that have been envisaged by 
Central and State Finance Commissions on one hand and the 74
th 
Constitution Ammendment on the other. We begin with a prologue 
that provides a backdrop with information about the ULBs in 
Maharashtra along with some regulatory and conceptual features. 
The major section or the core of this paper is divided into various 
subsections and deals with data analysis and comments about the 
expenditure and revenue patterns of Municipal Corporations, and 
Municipal Councils. The last section (Epilogue) contains 
observations about the data gaps and finally we provide concluding 
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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MUNICIPAL FINANCES IN MAHARASHTRA:  
PATTERNS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The main thrust of this paper – as the title suggests –  is to examine the  
patterns of finances in ULBs in Maharashtra and present a comparative picture 
thereof. We also point out some problems (data problems included) and suggest 
some ways for remedying the situation. This is contextualized within the parameters 
set by the devolution patterns to local bodies that have been envisaged by Central 
and State Finance Commissions on one hand and the 74
th Constitution 
Ammendment on the other. Given the domestic macroeconomic situation that Indian 
economy is faced with (partly due to external events and partly policy induced) the 
scarcity of resources at all levels of government has to be recognized as a stark 
reality. Of course, the funds flowing from higher level goverments are not the only 
ones available to Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). ULBs have revenue generation powers 
of their own and a measure of sustainablility and efficiency of local bodies is how well 
these match up with their functions. Without this, the de jure transfer of functions to 
ULBs will be a vacuous exercise with no de facto change. In this paper however, we 
will not be discussing the important issues connected with the devolution formulae 
(See Karnik and Pethe 2001 for details specific to Maharshtra) or alternative sources 
of resource raising effort except perhaps tangentially. Such a discussion will take us 
far afield and be a subject fit for a separate paper. Comprehensive treatment of these 
matters is  available to the interested reader in our UNDP/UNCHS study (Karnik et al 
2002a) as well as some of the other work listed in the references. 
Here we look at the revenue and expenditure patterns of ULBs in 
Maharashtra. This is meant to be a status report and contains also a proto type 
exercise in data organisation that we believe is insightful and may be gainfully 
replicated for other states. While the aggregate picture has its own charm and 
importance, it is important to have a comparative picture as well as to disaggregted 
look at select ULBs. Elsewhere, we have studied the finances of three MCs in 
Maharashtra – Navi Mumbai, Pimpri-Chinchwad and Thane as case studies. (see 
Karnik et al 2002a).` 
The treatment of data tables in this paper is inconveniently hapazard, testing 
the limits of avant garde style. Whilst admitting it, it must be put down not to our 
intent but to the constraints imposed by availability (or indeed non-availability) of – 
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 especially uniform – data. The data sources have temporily varied. Some of it was 
taken directly from ministries of the State Government (when we were doing the 
UNDP/State Finance Commission work) some of it from Bureau of Economics and 
Statistics and some from the ULBs themselves. Thus, whereas the magnitude of data 
available is huge, it is often incomparable in several ways.  
The paper is organised in four sections including the introduction. The second 
section is by way of a prologue and provides a backdrop with information about the 
ULBs in Maharashtra along with some regulatory and conceptual features. The third 
section is the major section or the core of this paper. It is divided into various sub-
sections and deals with data and comments about the expenditure and revenue 
patterns of Municipal Corporations, and then Municipal Councils.It also provides a 
brief sub-section containing data table updates. Section 4 contains observations 
about the data gaps and finally we provide concluding reflections. 
2.  PROLOGUE: URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN MAHARASHTRA 
The heterogeneity among the ULBs in Maharashtra begins from the variety of 
Acts that govern. Unlike other States, where all the ULBs are governed by an uniform 
act, ULBs in Maharashtra are governed by the following four Acts: 
¾  Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, 
¾  City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, 
¾  Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949,  
¾  Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships 
Act, 1965. 
Even though the above Acts have gradually evolved in response to felt needs, 
it is only now that a need to have an uniform Act governing all the ULBs   
in the State is being recognized. This is especially true in the light of the   
74th Constitutional Amendment Act, Schedule 12 which lists out numerous functional 
responsibilities for ULBs in addition to those which were already being performed. 
Consequently, State Acts, particularly those aspects relating to obligatory and 
discretionary functions, need to be appropriately modified to reflect the spirit of the 
Constitutional Amendments. For details on broad divisions as well as heterogeneity 
in terms of area, population et al., between ULBs within each class, again see Pethe 
et al 2002a. Also to be found in the same paper are the details regarding the de jure 
powers and responsibilities of the ULBs in Maharashtra. This would form the 
backdrop against which we shall be evaluating the functioning of the ULBs with 




Revenues of ULBs in Maharashtra 
The operations of ULBs are governed by various provisions in the State Acts 
which are the fountainhead of the powers of local bodies. The sources of revenue are 
mandated by such provisions and their autonomy in taxation is circumscribed by 
these. Also, their autonomy for deciding expenditure priorities is similarly limited. 
Hence it is essential to understand the provisions in the State Acts regarding the 
revenues and expenditure powers of the ULBs, again for details see Pethe et al., 
2002a. 
Revenues of ULBs can be broadly classified as revenues from own sources 
and those from external sources, such as grants from the State and loans. Again, 
own sources of revenues can be categorized as tax revenues and non tax revenues. 
There are specific provisions in the State Acts, regarding taxation powers of the 
ULBs. Article 243X of the Constitution, inserted after the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment Act (CAA) envisages, that States should devolve additional taxation 
powers to ULBs, so as to make them financially competent for discharging the added 
functional responsibilities, mandated by the succeeding Article 243W. However, in 
Maharashtra, there has been no such devolution of taxation powers, which would 
have been expected since it would have been in consonance with the process of 
decentralization. Instead, we have seen that taxation powers of small ULBs regarding 
octroi have been withdrawn by the State in March 1999. Hence, the taxation powers 
of the ULBs are limited to its traditional sphere and have not gone beyond various 
existing provisions in the State Acts. Section 139 of the BMC Act 1888, Section 127 
of the BPMC Act 1949 and Section 108 of the Councils Act 1965, provides taxation 
powers of the ULBs regarding various items.Further, even within this list there are 
provisions in the State Acts that further reduce the flexibility of the ULBs. This can be 
illustrated by property tax, where Municipal Corporations (MCs) in Maharashtra can 
levy property tax as a percentage of annual ratable value of the property, and ceilings 
for such percentages are laid down by different State Acts.  
It can be seen that BMC has no autonomy regarding the components and 
rate for each component of the tax, while Nagpur has limited autonomy. All other 
MCs (governed by BPMC Act) have autonomy regarding the rate of tax in case of 
components related to water supply and sewerage only. However, there is no 
freedom to any MC regarding inclusion of any new component or changing the tax 
base to some other, say, area. In the case of Municipal Councils, property tax is 
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 levied as a consolidated property tax, but different ceilings for tax rate, as a 
percentage of the annual ratable value, are similarly prescribed by the State vide 
provisions in Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial 
Townships Act, 1965. For detailed information the interested reader may see Pethe 
et al 2002a. 
It is clear from the above discussion, that ULBs have a very limited choice 
regarding taxation, which is further restricted by various regulating principles decided 
by the State. Whilst it can be granted that the higher level government should play a 
supervising and controlling role, the restrictions imposed on ULBs seem to be 
suffocating them. The important point being made here is, that ULBs have a very 
limited autonomy vis-à-vis sources of their revenues, and hence the entire revenue-
expenditure process needs to be assessed bearing this in mind. Like taxation, the 
non tax revenues of the ULBs are also limited to conventional sources. The power of 
ULBs in Maharashtra appear to be highly restricted with respect to both, the tax and 
the non tax sources of revenues, which constitute their own sources. This has forced 
the ULBs to be dependent on the State for their finances. These constitute external 
sources of finance, which complement the own sources of ULBs. 
The external sources of revenues for the ULBs are grants from the State. 
There are about thirty types of grants flowing towards the ULBs under different major 
and minor heads in the State budget.  
•  Many grants (octroi, profession tax, pilgrim, road etc.) are compensatory in 
nature. Those grants are given subsequent to withdrawal of respective taxation 
powers of the ULBs, indicating the centralizing tendencies of the State.   
•  The distributive principles are not uniform. It is not the case that all ULBs receive 
all types of grants and each type of grant is often disbursed at varying rates to 
different ULBs.  
¾  The nature of disbursements grants is purely ad hoc without any legitimate right 
of the ULB. The underlying uncertainty clearly affects the planning of expenditure 
strategies by the ULBs. 
Thus, we might state that grants from the State do not really help the ULBs in 
major developmental works, but merely support their day-to-day functioning. More 
generally, revenues of the ULBs have been throtled by such inherent structural 
bottlenecks like, small bandwidth for non tax revenues, and unpredictable nature of 
funds flowing from the State. 
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 Expenditures of ULBs in Maharashtra 
Expenditures by ULBs are basically for providing various services to citizens. 
The 74th CAA has added a list of 18 services to be performed by local bodies. 
However, since Maharashtra has a long tradition of ULBs, even before its 
Constitutional recognition by the 74th CAA, many of the functions listed in the Twelfth 
Schedule were already being performed by them, and ULBs were incurring expenses 
on these.   
  As stated previously, there are four State Acts governing ULBs in 
Maharashtra. Sections in those Acts, describe the duties and responsibilities of the 
ULBs, or the items on which the ULBs are expected to spend. What is important to 
note is that functional devolution to the ULBs has not been matched by supporting 
financial devolution. This has lead to too many responsibilities chasing a narrow 
resource base. Problems for ULBs have been further aggravated by the stipulation in 
the Municipal Acts that ULBs must balance their budgets. The plethora of contraints 
on the ULBs has made it difficult to establish whether non-performance represents 
dereliction of duty or inability to perform due to lack of funds.  
  It is well accepted that the main economic argument in favour of 
decentralisation is in terms of allocative efficiency. The public sector is best suited to 
provide goods and services, which have ‘public goods’ characteristics that are 
characterised by non-excludability (NE -  Difficulty of excluding a person who does 
not pay for the benefits of the good or service) and joint consumption (JC - The 
availability of the benefits of the good to more than one individual at the same time). 
 In order to analyse the expenditure pattern we have used one classification 
as what the Eleventh Finance Commission has defined as ‘core services’ While 
provision of core services is a useful way of looking at the performance of MCs, the 
term ‘core services’ does not have a precise connotation in economics. A more 
precise and sound theoretical concept is that of local public goods (LPG). The 
benefits of such public goods that are spatially restricted are known as LPG. Our 
definition of Local Public Goods has been modified to exclude water (which can be 
metered and hence charged) and include fire brigade. The definition of Local Public 
Goods was also extended to include Education, Sanitation, Fire Brigade, Water, 
Roads and Street Lighting. This was done to include some essential merit goods that 
have traditionally been considered as falling within the purview of ULBs’ service 
delivery. Expenditures on general administration and salaries are an essential part of 
the expenses being incurred by all ULBs. However, burgeoning expenses on this 
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 head implies that less remains for spending on public goods. With larger 
expenditures on this front being at the expense of public goods provision, any effort 
to reduce expenditures on general administration and salaries is seen to be an 
indicator of improvement in performance. 
3.  EXAMINATION OF EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE PATTERN OF ULBs IN 
MAHARASHTRA
1
  This section is organised as follows: in the first sub-section, we look at the 
Municipal Corporations and the subsequent subsection looks at the Municipal 
Councils. Within each subsection we first look at the expenditure side and then the 
revenue side performance. 
3.1.  An Examination of Expenditure and Revenue Patterns of Municipal 
Corporations in Maharashtra 
This section looks at the financial performance of all Municipal Corporations 
in the state of Maharashtra. Whilst we would have liked to take a view on the quality 
of service delivery by the corporations, devoid of any direct data this has to be done 
by examining the finances of the corporations and trying to identify patterns with 
respect to various expenditure heads. We do this specifically to isolate expenditures 
on provision of important services to citizens within the jurisdiction of the 
corporations.  
Expenditure Patterns 
  As explained earlier we look at the expenditure pattern over time with the help 
of a summary table (Table 1) which is self-explanatory. This is followed by comments 
on the trends. 
•  A very gradually increasing trend is noticed in the proportion of expenditure 
being incurred on the core services with the exception of a 0.1 percentage 
point reduction in 1998-9. In 1999-2000 the ratio stood at 39.18 percent. 
•  We find that the proportion of expenditure being incurred on LPG-services is 
lower than the ratio obtained for the EFC core services. The increasing trend 
is less pronounced than in the case of EFC. 
•  With the extended definition of LPG the ratio of expenditure on these services 
is obviously higher than the other two cases, with the expected trend pattern.  
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on Pethe, Karnik and Karmarkar (2001) where a more detailed analysis in 
per capita terms, growth rates etc. have been worked out. The paper also makes a comparison by 
building 3 different scenarios which include/exclude major corporations.  
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 •  Of the expenditure categories, the highest proportion of expenditure was 
incurred on general administration, pensions etc. It does, however, show a 
gradually declining trend. It fluctuated by about one percentage point over the 
four years.  
•  Education is a public good with considerable ‘merit’. Hence, higher the 
expenditure on education, the better the performance. The proportion of 
expenditure on education, free reading halls etc., shows a steady decline. 
•  Expenditure on Water Supply as percent of total expenditure has shown a 
steady increase, whether it has resulted in improvement in quality or increase 
in magnitude is a moot point. 
• Expenditure  on  epidemics and public health has fluctuated around the   
5 percent mark in the following four years and it is a safe bet to say that there 
is considerable scope for improvement here. 
Maharashtra, is a highly urbanized State, and within the urban population of 
Maharashtra, the majority is from a selected few towns, declared as MCs by the 
State Government. This makes MCS a distinguished set of ULBs.  
Income Pattern 
  Good governance involves not only adequate provision of services to citizens, 
but also generating sufficient revenues to cover the cost of providing these services. 
In the previous section we have examined the expenditure patterns of all MCs with 
respect to various budget heads. In this section we now look at the other side of the 
budget and examine the income patterns of MCs. Different sources of income as 
ratios to total income and own income (Table 2). The salient points to emerge are the 
following: 
•  Grants from State government as a ratio to total income have declined 
slightly.  
•  The share of loans in total income has increased significantly. 
•  Of the own sources of income, the share of octroi has been the highest but it 
has registered a gradual decline.  
•  The share of property tax has risen gradually but there is much scope here.  
•  Water charges represent another source of significant untapped potential. 
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 •  The same may be said about the ‘Licence fees and Entertainment’ as well as 
‘Building Rents’ that have remained rather insignificant proportion of the 
overall income. 




3.2 An Examination of Expenditure Patterns of All Municipal Councils in 
Maharashtra 
This section looks at the financial performance of all Municipal Councils in the 
state of Maharashtra. This can be done by examining the finances of the Councils, 
the treatment following similar pattern to that in case of Municipal Corporations. 
Expenditure Patterns 
    As explained earlier we try to identify patterns with respect to various 
expenditure heads. We do this specifically to isolate expenditures on provision of 
important services to citizens within the jurisdiction of the councils. (Table 3). 
•  In case of EFC core services we find that A class councils performed the best 
between 1995-6 and 1998-9. Both B and C Class councils were very close. 
Finally in 1999-2000 B class councils out performed the other two and A class 
councils registered the lowest ratio of 24.6 percent. 
•  For local public goods too A class continues to be the best between 1995-6 
and 1998-9 and C continues to be the worst. In 1999-00 A class has the 
lowest ratio while B class had the highest ratio.  
•  For extended Local Public Goods too A class continues to be the best 
between 1995-6 and 1998-9 and C the worst. However, in 1999-2000 we find 
B class to be the best performer and A class the worst as was observed with 
the EFC definition. 
•  In 1995-6 B class councils fared the best with the largest proportion   
of total expenditure being spent on education. A class councils performed the 
worst with the lowest proportion. In 1996-7 while A class councils continued to 
fare the worst, the expenditure proportion of C class councils just marginally 
surpassed that of B class. In 1999-2000 A class councils, which had been the 
worst performers suddenly, outperformed the others.  
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 •  In 1995-6 A class councils have continued to incur the highest expenditures 
on water supply and C class councils the lowest of 10.58 percent   Since 
1996-7, however, the proportion of expenditure on water supply has been the 
highest for B class councils. C class councils have consistently remained in 
third position.  
•  In case of Health, in 1995-6 A class councils were the best performers and C 
class the worst. In 1996-7 B class councils outperformed A class, while C 
class continued to fare the worst. In 1997-8 once again A class councils 
reverted to being on top and C class were at the bottom. In 1998-9 while C 
class councils continued to remain at the bottom of the list, the first position 
was again that of B class. In 1999-2000 there was a complete turnaround with 
C class, the worst performers so far, topping the list.  
•  As mentioned in case of the discussion on corporations, expenditures on 
general administration and salaries appear to be incurred at the cost of public 
goods provision. Hence, those councils which incur the lowest expenditures 
on this category of expenditure can be deemed to be the best performers. In 
each of the years between 1995-6 and 1999-2000 A class councils have been 
the best performers with the lowest proportion of total expenditures of being 
incurred on general administration and salaries. Not only have the A class 
councils outperformed the other categories, but they have also bettered their 
own performance by reducing the proportion of their expenditure going to 
general administration and salaries. Although C class councils performed 
better than B class in 1995-6, since 1996-7 B class councils have consistently 
fared better than C class.  
Income Patterns  
We now look at the other side of the budget and examine the income patterns of 
Municipal Councils (Table 4). 
•  The share of grants in total income has been the largest for C class councils 
and the lowest for A class councils in each of the years. The year 1999-2000 
has witnessed a sharp increase in the share of grants for each of the council 
categories. The increase is probably due to compensation for octroi. 
•  The share of loans in total income has been the largest for A class councils 
and the lowest for B class councils (tragedy of the middle). The share of the 
loan component for A class councils in their total income shows an increasing 
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 trend while the share of loans in their total income for B and C class councils 
shows a declining trend.  
•  The share of own income in total income is seen to be the largest for A class 
councils and the lowest for C class councils in each of the years between 
1995-6 and 1998-9. In the last year 1999-2000 a sharp decline in the share of 
own income is registered for all categories of councils. 
•  The share of Octroi in own income has been the largest for A class councils 
for all the years. C class councils recorded the lowest share in 1995-6 and 
1996-7. Since then its performance has been marginally better than B class 
councils. In the year 1999-2000 a sharp decline was registered for all council 
categories. 
•  In case of Property Tax, A class councils have consistently been the worst 
performers although its own performance has improved in 1997-8 and again 
in 1999-2000. B councils have fared the best in each of the years and its own 
performance too has steadily improved. 
Having looked at the statistics relating to revenue expenditue patterns in the 
Municipal Councils in Maharashtra, let us extend this – albeit briefly – to later years. 
3.3 A Brief Update: Twist in the Tail 
  We now look briefly at the Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils 
data for some later years. This data represented in the following table refers to the 
number of Municipal bodies as they exist now. Thus there are 22 Municipal 
Corporations (referred to as E – class). Thus there are problems of data 
reconciliation on account of coverage as well as definitions. Hence the broad picture 
that emerges from more recent data (in the table below) is not strictly comparable 
with the discussion in sections 3.1 and 3.2 above. However, the broader picture that 
seems to emerge is very similar from both data sets. An important point to keep in 
mind is that we are talking about proportions. We are also aware that what we need 
to be concerned with is the actual service delivery (quality and magnitude) and not 
just the expenditure incurred.  






EFC CORE SERVICES                                               
(water, sanitation, public Light, roads)  
   A class  B class  C class  E class  Maharashtra
1999-00 39.08  33.38 38.06 38.25  38.06
2000-01 32.84  31.50 26.31 40.79  40.46
2001-02 35.56  31.21 26.30 40.32  40.00
2002-03 35.59  33.64 30.97 38.58  38.42
 
A class councils were the best performers in 1999/00, even better than the 
State average and Municipal Corporations (E class). While it has maintained its first 
position among council categories, it has fallen behind Corporations since 2000/01. 
The graph below shows the pattern over the four years under consideration: 



















  Clearly C class councils have been the worst performers although it has 
bettered its own performance in recent years. 
  Local PUG                                           
(sanitation, public Light, roads)                       
   A class   B class   C class  E class  Maharashtra 
1999-00 21.52 20.48 23.20 23.26 23.20 
2000-01 18.23 19.18 16.76 26.07 25.12 
2001-02 19.57 18.23 15.99 24.97 24.14 
2002-03 20.35 19.33 18.49 25.42 24.78 
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  In case of LPG, Corporations have clearly performed better than the Councils. 
From among councils, surprisingly C class councils were the best in 1999/00 but 
since then they have fallen behind A and B in subsequent years.  
  When the EFC core services are extended to a broad definition of Local 
Public Goods which also includes education and health a similar pattern emerges. 
 
Local PUG extended                                                
(sanitation, public light, water, roads +education + health) 
   A class   B class   C class  E class 
Maharashtr
a 
1999-00 53.85  48.08 54.34 54.51  54.34
2000-01 49.21  48.28 41.55 58.68  57.27
2001-02 51.30  46.80 39.05 57.64  56.25
2002-03 51.61  48.45 45.02 53.45  52.92
 
C class Councils are seen to be the best among the council categories in 1999/00. 
Since then it has ranked last among council categories. A class councils have been 
the best among councils but far short of corporations.  
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Two interesting observations from two of the three graphs above are: 
(a) Corporations have outperformed the Councils, as is to be expected, given 
that they have larger resource base. 
(b) The proportion of expenditure by Corporations on EFC core service, LPG and 
Extended LPG shows a declining trend while that of Councils shows a 
generally rising trend.   
  From the broad categories examined above we ventured to delve a little into 
specific heads of expenditure and came up with some interesting results:   
 
   










1999-00 11.14 11.47 9.09 9.00 9.09 
2000-01 12.57 13.49 13.15 10.49 10.56 
2001-02 12.15 12.47 11.07 10.74 10.76 




















  The graph above paints a somewhat surprising picture. All three council 
categories record higher proportions being spent on education than Municipal 
Corporations. However, this result corroborates the finding in the previous time 
period. Thus nothing much appears to have changed with respect to allocations 
made towards education in the last decade. 
The case of expenditure on health is a cause for worry. Across the board, one 
finds a declining trend and one fears that the reduction is not on wasteful 
expenditure! 
Health/Total Exp. (%) 
 
   A class  B class  C class  E class  Maharashtra 
1999-00 3.63 3.22 7.18 7.26 7.18
2000-01 3.81 3.29 2.08 7.40 7.31
2001-02 3.58 3.12 1.69 6.58 6.49




















   
In case of expenditure on administration, we would like to draw attention to 
the fact that the General Administration expenditure category referred to here 
excludes salaries and pensions and hence the pattern observed here is not strictly 
comparable with the discussion on this category in the previous section. However, 
one can observe that across board there is no real sign of significant reduction of 
expenditure under this head. Given the committed nature of Salaries and Pensions 
as well as the inherent increasing trend thereof, the same must be true of the broader 
category. Considerable thought and effort in this regard is called for if the ULBs have 
to be left with greater resources to perform their core functions. 







class E  class Maharashtra 
1999-00 10.62 15.05  6.84  6.84 6.84 
2000-01 10.95 15.07  7.85  16.97 7.85 
2001-02 10.20 14.02  6.90  15.45 6.90 
2002-03 9.41 14.17 6.67  18.17 6.67 
 
E class Councils i.e. Municipal Corporations have consistently been the best 
performers – spending the lowest proportion on administration expenditure. All 
Councils spend larger proportions. This finding is no surprise at all since we are 
looking at the ratio of administrative expenditure to total expenditures. The 
denominator (i.e total expenditures) of Councils are heavily dependent on funding 
from state and central government. Given the fiscal stress that the state government 
total expenditures of councils have not grown significantly. The numerator, on the 
other hand, i.e. administration expenditures are largely mandatory (even though our 
definition here excludes salaries and pensions) hence need to be maintained. This 
explains the councils performing worse than Corporations which have greater 
resource base.  
  From among the Councils the C class councils, the smallest category, have 
been the worst performers since 2000/01 although they were spending a much 
smaller proportion in 1999/00 probably suggesting a reduction in the growth of 
devolution of funds in more recent years.    
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Thus the broad picture that emerges from the Expenditure side is 
(a) Corporations have outperformed the Councils: They spend a larger proportion 
of their total expenditure on education, health and other local public goods. 
(b) It is, however, a matter of concern that Corporations show a declining trend 
for all the ‘desirable’ expenditure categories. 
(c) The pattern regarding expenditure on Hospitals, Dispensary and Vaccinations 
(Health), in particular, is worrisome as all ULBs show a declining trend. 
(d) With restricted revenue raising powers, Councils are compelled to spend 
larger proportions on administrative expenditures, which are mandatory, 
leaving them with little elbow room to spend on public goods.      
After a detailed look at the expenditure patterns across ULBs, we now turn 
























         
A CLASS  1999-00  35.38  41.08  18.87  10.79 
 2000-01  23.98  41.32  5.98  12.78 
 2001-02  24.42  38.61  6.34  12.04 
 2002-03  23.09  45.00  5.21  13.21 
                 
B CLASS  1999-00  31.43  47.03  11.83  12.57 
 2000-01  24.22  48.83  4.69  13.44 
 2001-02  23.95  47.68  3.32  13.59 
 2002-03  26.24  50.39  4.44  13.77 
                 
C CLASS  1999-00  25.53  43.88  10.63  9.60 
  2000-01 21.65 43.52  5.81  10.13 
  2001-02 21.33 43.19  5.03  10.09 
  2002-03 23.72 46.12  5.70  11.33 
               
E CLASS  1999-00  59.74  5.98  39.84  16.11 
 2000-01  60.00  6.34  38.75  17.19 
 2001-02  57.03  5.23  33.85  17.24 
 2002-03  52.37  3.92  34.35  13.12 
                
Maharashtra 
state 1999-00  55.86  11.14  36.25  15.40 
 2000-01  55.17  11.28  34.88  16.19 
  2001-02 52.66 10.15  30.08  16.52 
  2002-03 49.05  9.06  30.88  13.08 
 
•  The own source revenues show a marked depletion for A and B type of Councils. 
Clearly taking away of significant taxation powers like Octroi by the state 
government is the reason for it. C type councils are the smallest and have the 
smallest resource base. What is a cause for concern is the performance of 
Municipal Corporations (E class councils). Despite the fact that Corporations 
continue to have the right to impose Octroi, their reduction in own source 
revenues is on account of bottlenecks to improve their performance on Property 
tax front as will be discussed in a subsequent paragraph.  
•  It must be said that while the government grants have been declining on the 
whole, the A, B and C type councils have witnessed a modest rise in the 2002/03. 
Given that the resource raising powers of Councils is restricted, this increase in 
the share of grants is welcome. However, one is not sure if this is a welcome sign 
from the point of view of governance in the context of move towards greater 
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 decentralisation which must aim at strengthening the local bodies to stand on 
their own feet. 
•  As a move towards simplification of the tax structure the power to impose Octroi 
has been taken away from Councils, which now avail of a grant in lieu of Octroi. 
Corporations, on the other hand continue to retain this power. This move has 
further served to increase the dependence of the already dependent local bodies 
on higher levels of government. 
•  The revenue from Taxes on Housing and Land has not shown any significant 
increase over the years as it should. In fact Corporations show a reduction in the 
share of this category in their total income. Clearly the Rent Control Act and other 
bottlenecks as regards the Annual Rental Value method currently used has acted 
as an impediment to tapping this revenue source to its potential (Karnik et. al. 
2004)   
The broad story on the income side is that revenue decentralisation has failed 
to keep pace with expenditure decentralisation. For de facto decentralisation to 
happen it is important that resource raising powers of ULBs be strengthened. It is in 
this context that we have, elsewhere, suggested a possible strategy for enabling 
ULBs to access credit markets. The methodology suggested by us provides us with 
yet another way of comparing the ULBs. In the section that follows we briefly discuss 
the extension of Pooled Fund strategy that we advocate (Pethe and Lalvani, 2004).    
4. EPILOGUE: On Data Gaps 
The ULBs have been examined and compared from the perspective of both, 
financial and physical performance, wherein data gaps were discerned on both 
fronts. The importance of identifying and rectifying these cannot be overemphasised 
in the context of system design for better governance and delivery of services.   
•  From the point of view of financial performance indicators there does not exist 
uniformity in the data available under various budget heads, which would make 
comparisons possible and meaningful. This is especially true when substantive 
definitions of budget heads undergo a change temporally.  
•  It is only for a few categories like water supply, conservancy and sanitation, 
licence fees and entertainment that we had the relevant information on both, 
income from that service and expenditure on it. For other categories of 
expenditure like education, roads, public health we did not find data on income 
from these services. Availability of data on both, income and expenditure from 
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 these various services would have enabled us to evaluate the performance of 
each of these services.  
•  It may be pertinent here to mention that it has often been observed that efficiency 
of local bodies is evaluated on a purely financial basis with very little attention 
being paid to the quality of the utilisation of funds.  Also, as regards data on 
expenditure for each of these services, availability of data at a greater level of dis-
aggregation, specifically relating to the amount of expense being incurred on 
salaries of staff etc. would have enabled us substantially to carry the analysis 
forward. It was also felt that the category of expenditure on General 
administration, salaries etc., is too broad. For example, in case of health services, 
a distinction between salaries of doctors and paramedics and ‘others’ would have 
helped. Thus, a further sub-division of this broad category into the salaries of 
various categories of employees would enable us to pinpoint the areas that are 
unproductive and/or wasteful.  
•  On the front of physical performance and comparison of service delivery, it was 
found that getting information required by us involved considerable effort on the 
part of the personnel to cull out the relevant statistics. It should be made binding 
on the ULBs to maintain records of such data in a uniform and standardised 
format. It is only then that accurate comparisons would become possible. Indeed, 
an exercise is already underway to bring about a standardised and uniform (from 
the audit and accounts point of view) accounting system across ULBs in India.  
•  It was observed that some relevant details of physical data pertaining to crucial 
services were missing. For instance, we were unable to obtain information 
separately on domestic and commercial use of water. Such a distinction would 
have made it possible for us to see if the requirements of citizens were being met 
or not. A severe shortcoming of the data being collected and currently available is 
that the quality aspect has not received due attention. In fact there does not seem 
to be any mechanism in place to monitor the continued quality (maintenance 
aspect) of services provided. The only – even if welcome – innovation seems to 
be with respect to the efficient rectification vis-à-vis the complaints.  It is because 
of this lack of data pertaining to the quality of existing services and the 
continuation thereof, that this aspect has had to be largely ignored in any 
empirical exercise 
•  It is only when both, physical and financial data are available can we get   
the broad picture to become clear. For instance, merely the information that 66 
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 percent of total expenditure is being incurred on education is inadequate. It is not 
possible to judge from this the actual achievement of a particular ULB in 
promotion of education. For such an analysis we would require information on 
how many children completed schooling and how many actually received 
education. It is only with availability of such information that we will be able to 
comment on the efficiency in the actual delivery of the service and hence properly 
incorporate it in the principles prescribed for rewards and penalties. 
•  The ideal situation for targeting disbursements is the availability of detailed data 
at the level of the Local Body. This will include, apart from information on the 
financial performance of the Local Body, other “real” data, such as total income 
generated, population, area, poverty ratios, level of backwardness, quality of 
infrastructure (separately for water supply, sanitation, street lighting, etc). 
However, as we have found out during the course of our exercises, much of such 
“real” data are available only at the level of the districts while at the level of Local 
Bodies only financial data are available in detail. As far as some Local Bodies 
were concerned there were data gaps even with respect to availability of financial 
data. This was more likely to be the case at the level of Category ‘C’ Class 
Councils. 
•  The next step in the decentralisation process is one where we go beyond the 
level of the ULB, i.e., beyond the MCs, Councils A, B and C. This would imply 
going to the level of wards within each ULB. While the concept of decentralisation 
could logically extend to the ultimate unit in the jurisdiction, i.e., the citizen, 
practically we need to set some limits. These practical limits will have to be set by 
constitutional provisions relating to the decentralised unit. At the moment such 
provisions have been put in place up to ULBs only. Further, there are no 
provisions at the level of the state Acts which extend decentralisation below the 
level of ULBs.  
•  In spite of this, it remains a fact that functions of the ULB get decentralised to the 
ward level. Hence, we can say that actual service delivery takes place at the ward 
level and consequently the functioning of the wards should be a matter of 
concern to us. However, it needs to be borne in mind that wards or ward 
committees do not have functional autonomy and more importantly do not have 
financial autonomy. Wards have to function as per the dictates of the Chief 
Officer and Standing Committee of the ULB. 
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 •  Despite the above, since actual service delivery takes place at the level of the 
wards and hence citizens’ welfare is crucially determined at this level, it would be 
important to assess the functioning of the wards. Naturally, for such a task to be 
undertaken far more detailed data would have to be available. This, however, is 
likely to be a formidable task. To undertake the task of data collection at the ward 
level will be gigantic, however desirable the objective may be. We have not been 
able to get any information beyond the level of the ULB.  
•  Bearing in mind the data gaps that we have discusses above, we would like to 
see an technologically empowered, autonomous agency for collection, analysis 
and updating of a variety of standardized data across ULBs to be in place. Whilst 
there should be local operational branches they need to be conceptually 
integrated at the central level so as to ensure that ‘they all speak the same 
language’. Such urban observatories could be of tremendous value not only for 
‘official’ use but will also serve ‘academic’ or ‘scholarly’ needs for meaningful and 
comparable data. This will also serve to strengthen the civil society intervention. 
Concluding Reflections 
  The time has now come to conclude this paper. Some broad reflections/ 
observations are in order: 
•  Sans all rhetoric and political posturing it is incontrovertible that the future of India 
is decidedly Urban. This implies that substantively greater resources must be 
devolved to the urban sector than has been the case in the past. The needs of 
urban infrastructure (even restricted to consideration of basic services we have 
considered) are huge and there is an accelerating divergence between the 
revenues and expenditures of the ULBs across board. Greater resources must 
simply be forthcoming (devolved or raised). 
•  To meaningfully operationalize the spirit and letter of 74
th CAA, it is necessary 
that ULBs come out with a serious and innovative action plan to increase their 
resources. There is an obvious limit to the extent of devolution from above. While 
we have already said that we cannot go into the detailed discussion of alternative 
ways of tapping such resources a mention here would perchance, not be out of 
place. 
1. Property tax rationalisation represents a huge avenue of improving the 
revenue position of many ULBs. However, given the dearth of reliable 
information and the lack of political will, the ULBs will have to (cutting across 
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 party lines) make concerted effort for this potential to be effectively tapped 
(Karnik et. al., 2001). 
2.  Creation of Pooled fund bank like institutional arrangement is the way to go in 
an era of market driven economy. Again, regulatory changes will have to be 
brought about in the financial sector (especially in the mandate and conduct 
of Bank and Fis) for this to materialize (Pethe and Ghodke, 2001). 
3.  Getting the ULBs rated and floating of Muni Bonds is another modern method 
of raising resources. Efficiency and accountability as well as transparency in 
terms of maintaining accounts (in conformity with uniform and best 
established practices) is essential. For this to be successful, there is also a 
need for macro level policy initiative by way of facilitating existence of deep, 
thick and hence vibrant secondary market in such paper (muni bonds) (Pethe 
and Ghodke, 2002). 
•  These are only some of the ways that one can think of. Again, for details in this 
regard interested readers are referred to Karnik et al (2002a) and Pethe & Lalvani 
(2004) 
•  Finally and most importantly, the one thing that needs urgent and serious 
attention is the data gaps especially with reference to quality of service 
delivery as well as the unavailability of dis-aggregate data on many items. 
These need to be collected uniformly for all ULBs as a matter of standard 
practice to facilitate analysis, prognosis, diagnosis and hence policy 
recommendations. For this setting up of well funded, techno-savvy and 
autonomous urban observatories must be set up. 
In the end, we believe that, we have provided a fairly comprehensive status 
report on the different aspects related to – revenue expenditure patterns – ULBs in 
Maharashtra. For the purposes of evolving objective and transparent criteria for 
devolution of funds from centre to the states as well as further down to the ward 
levels and conducting a comparative analysis between states, such an exercise is 
useful as a foundational building block. Hence, this needs to be replicated across 
states. This involves a major exercise especially in terms of major data gaps that we 
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